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LIABILITY AND CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO BE 
SUED—TORTS IN GENERAL: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIM 
ACT’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO 
Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Millbrook v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held 
the law enforcement proviso—an exception to the Federal Tort Claim Act’s 
(“FTCA”) preservation of sovereign immunity for intentional torts—
applied to torts committed by law enforcement officers regardless of 
whether the officer was engaged in investigative or law enforcement 
activity.  The Court, granting certiorari to address a division among circuits 
as to how the proviso should be interpreted, reasoned that a plain reading of 
the statute’s text revealed congressional intent for immunity determinations 
to depend on officers’ legal authority, not the specific activity they were 
performing during the alleged tort.  Thus, under the Court’s holding in 
Millbrook, the question of whether the government has waived sovereign 
immunity to intentional torts via the law enforcement proviso depends on 
the powers invested in the officer, not whether the officer  was conducting a 
search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.  The Court’s holding in 
Millbrook will increase the federal government’s liability in regard to torts 
committed by law enforcement officers, and it leaves certain significant 
questions unanswered. 
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I. FACTS 
On January 18, 2011, Kim Millbrook filed suit under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States, asserting claims of 
negligence, assault, and battery.1  Millbrook’s complaint alleged that on 
March 5, 2010, while he was incarcerated in federal prison, he was placed 
in a chokehold by one Federal Bureau of Prisons officer and forced to 
perform oral sex on another.2  The district court dismissed Millbrook’s suit, 
finding that under the FTCA, the government had only waived sovereign 
immunity for intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers when 
such torts occurred during a search, seizure of evidence, or arrest.3  In a per 
curiam opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court and summarily affirmed its decision.4 
 
1. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443-44 (2013). 
2. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (No 11-
10362).  The brief specifically alleged the following details: 
Petitioner Kim Millbrook is a prisoner incarcerated in the Special Management Unit at 
United States Penitentiary Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg).  On March 5, 2010, shortly 
after being transferred to USP Lewisburg, Millbrook was taken to a basement holding 
cell by a prison officer.  The officer who had transported Millbrook later returned with 
two other officers.  Millbrook was placed in restraints and removed from the cell.  One 
officer placed Millbrook in a choke hold and forced him to his knees.  Millbrook was 
then forced to perform oral sex on the second officer.  Throughout the incident, the 
third officer stood watch by the door.  The officers warned Millbrook that if he told 
anyone about the assault, they would kill him. 
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
3. Millbrook v. United States, No. 3:11-cv-131, 2012 WL 526000 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012). 
4. Millbrook v. United States, 477 Fed. Appx. 4, 6 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).  “Millbrook 
did not allege that the alleged conduct occurred in the course of an arrest for a violation of federal 
law, or during the course of a search . . . . As Millbrook’s appeal presents no substantial question, 
we will summarily affirm the District Court judgment.”  Id. at 5-7 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
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Millbrook subsequently filed an in forma pauperis petition,5 and on 
September 25, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States granted him a 
writ of certiorari.6  The Court limited its review to the question of 
“[w]hether 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2680(h) waive the sovereign 
immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards 
when they are acting within their scope of their employment but are not 
exercising authority to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 
arrests for violation of Federal law.”7  Initially, the United States, 
represented by the Department of Justice, intended to defend the Third 
Circuit’s decision.8  However, it later announced it agreed with Millbrook 
and that it would not defend the judgment below.9  Thereafter, the Court 
appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Third Circuit’s ruling.10 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Because it has sovereign immunity, the government of the United 
States cannot be sued in state or federal court.11  “If Congress so chooses, 
however, it may waive the United States’ sovereign immunity and prescribe 
the terms and conditions on which the United States consents to be sued and 
the manner in which the suit shall be conducted.”12  A discussion of the 
government’s waiver of immunity at the center of the dispute in 
Millbrook—the Federal Tort Claims Act—follows below.  But to provide 
context for that discussion, an analysis of the history and development of 
sovereign immunity is essential. 
 
5. “In the manner of an indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and court costs.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 386 (4th pocket ed. 2011).  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (West, Westlaw 
through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13); FED. R. APP. P. 24. 
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (No. 11-10362). 
7. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
8. Brief for the United States at 2, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (2013) (No. 11-10362). 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) 
(No. 11-10363) (Question from Justice Scalia: “[T]he United States didn’t take this position 
below, right?”  Government’s reply: “[W]e determined that the position [below] was . . . not 
correct under the text.”).  Id. 
10. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (2013) (No. 11-
10362). 
11. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (“It is unquestioned that the Federal 
Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own 
courts.”). 
12. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
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A. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The United States inherited the doctrine of sovereign immunity from 
England.13  “When the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in 
English law that the crown could not be sued without consent in its own 
courts.”14  As early as 1651, Thomas Hobbes attempted to explain the 
rationale behind the rule: “The sovereign . . . is not subject to the civil laws.  
For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth, free 
himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble 
him . . . .”15  The doctrine originated during feudal times.16  “[N]o lord 
could be sued by a vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject 
to suit in the courts of a higher lord.  Since the King was at the apex of the 
feudal pyramid, there was no higher court in which he could be sued.”17  
Many have lamented that such a doctrine is antithetical to a democratic 
system.  Justice Miller, reflecting on the differences between the English 
Monarchy and the United States, remarked: 
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the 
sovereign . . . The citizen here knows no person . . . to whom he 
must yield the rights which the law secures . . . there is no reason 
why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not even the 
United States, should prevent him from using the means which the 
law gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right.18 
Others have found legitimacy in the doctrine.  Despite their professed 
abhorrence to monarchial tyranny, prominent constitutional framers such as 
“Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, publicly 
endorsed the concept of sovereign immunity during the ratification process 
for the United States Constitution.”19  Madison declared: “[J]urisdiction in 
controversies between a state and citizens . . . is much objected to . . . It is 
not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.”20  Similarly, 
Hamilton wrote: “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
 
13. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (“[T]he doctrine is derived from the 
laws and practices of our English ancestors . . . it is beyond question that from the time of Edward 
the First until now the king of England was not suable in the courts of that country, except where 
his consent had been given on petition of right . . . .”). 
14. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. 
15. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 190 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904) (1651). 
16. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979) (“The doctrine, as it developed at 
common law, had its origins in the feudal system.”). 
17. Id. 
18. Lee, 106 U.S. at 208-09 (emphasis in original). 
19. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. 
REV. 439, 443 (2005). 
20. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2001). 
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amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . . This is the 
general sense, and the general practice of mankind . . . Unless, therefore, 
there is a surrender of this immunity . . . it will remain with the states.”21 
Remain with the states it has22—and also the federal government.  The 
Supreme Court, in a triad of landmark decisions, has defined the doctrine’s 
applicability to the federal government.23  Initially, the doctrine was largely 
discredited by a 5-4 majority vote in the historically captivating case of 
United States v. Lee.24  In a country still reeling from a devastating civil 
war, the Court was tasked with deciding the fate of present-day Arlington 
National Cemetery.25  The descendent of John Park Curtis—the adopted son 
of George Washington—Mary Anna Curtis inherited a tract of land and 
mansion then called the Arlington Estate.26  In the main hall of the 
Arlington Mansion, Curtis married a man who would later become the 
commander of the Confederate Army—Robert E. Lee.27  After General Lee 
accepted his commandership, the Lee family fled the Arlington Estate for 
Confederate-held territory.28  For obvious reasons, Mary Anna could not 
return to Union-held Alexandria, Virginia to pay taxes on the estate, so she 
sent a relative to pay the taxes for her.29  Because an owner of the estate 
was not tendering the money, the tax commissioner refused the proffered 
payment.30  The United States subsequently purchased Arlington at a tax 
sale; a Union general used it as his headquarters, and later it became the 
final resting place for Union casualties.31 
 
21. The Federalist No. 81 at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(1788). 
22. “[T]he Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by [the 
Supreme] Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they 
retain today . . . . Although the Constitution establishes a National Government with broad, often 
plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence, the founding document 
specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 
(1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 
(1997) (noting, as examples of Constitutional reservations of state immunity, “the prohibition on 
any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power 
Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the 
“Citizens” of the States; the amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-
fourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4 . . . .”). 
23. Sisk, supra note 19, at 466. 
24. 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882). 
25. Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1612, 1634 (1997). 
26. Sisk, supra note 19, at 447. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Siegel, supra note 25, at 1634. 
30. Id. 
31. Sisk, supra note 19, at 447-48. 
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In protest, Mary Anna’s son brought a suit in ejectment against military 
officers occupying the property.32  Recognizing what the dissent 
characterized as a clear end-around the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the 
Court allowed the suit to go forward: 
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law . . . All 
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are 
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it . . . Courts of justice 
are established, not only to decide upon the rights of the citizens 
against each other, but also upon rights in controversy between 
them and the government.33 
Accordingly, the Court allowed Lee to recover the Arlington property from 
the United States because he was suing officers of the government, and not 
the government itself.34  Justice Gray, in a dissenting opinion, objected to 
the Court’s disregard for sovereign immunity: 
To maintain an action for the recovery of possession of property 
held by the sovereign through its agents . . . is to maintain an 
action to recover possession of the property against the sovereign; 
and to invade such possession of the agents . . . is to invade the 
possession of the sovereign, and to violate the fundamental 
maxim, that the sovereign cannot be sued.35 
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,36 the Court 
looked more favorably on the doctrine.  Larson was decided on the heels of 
World War II; the plaintiff alleged the War Assets Administration had 
breached a contract regarding a sale of coal.37  Again, rather than suing the 
agency or government itself, the plaintiff sued the agency’s director.38  This 
time, the Court, finding legitimacy in the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
framed the question narrowly: 
The issue here is whether this particular suit is . . . in effect, a suit 
against the sovereign . . . If it is, then the suit is barred . . . because 
it is, in substance, a suit against the government over which the 
court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction . . . The district 
 
32. Id. at 448. 
33. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1982). 
34. Id. at 221.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Lee sold Arlington back to the 
federal government for the sum of $150,000, and today it remains a national military cemetery.  
Sisk, supra note 19, at 448. 
35. Lee, 106 U.S. at 226. 
36. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
37. Id. at 684. 
38. Id. 
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court held that this was relief against the sovereign and therefore 
dismissed the suit.  We agree.39 
In Malone v. Bowdoin,40 the Court “reinforced and extended the Larson 
rule and thus further solidified the doctrine of federal sovereign 
immunity.”41  Justice Stewart admitted Lee had never been overturned, but 
nonetheless found sovereign immunity barred yet another suit against a 
federal officer: 
[T]he Lee case has continuing validity only where there is a claim 
that the holding constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property 
without just compensation . . . No such claim has been advanced in 
the present case . . . [I]t was rightly dismissed by the District Court 
as an action which in substance and effect was one against the 
United States without its consent.42 
In sum, the Court has “reinvigorated the doctrine of federal sovereign 
immunity, and today it is well-ensconced within the legal structure of 
federal government civil liability.”43  Justice Holmes’s reflections on the 
logical and practical underpinnings of the doctrine, made more than a 
century ago, still find truth today: 
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a 
sovereign from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been 
public property since before the days of Hobbes.  A sovereign is exempt 
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on 
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against 
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.44 
B. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISO 
Yet, despite the entrenched doctrine of sovereign immunity, citizens 
were sometimes able to acquire redress for tortious injury caused by the 
federal government before passage of the FTCA in 1946.45  Rather than 
suing the United States, citizens could petition Congress to enact special 
legislation—called private bills—for the purpose of compensating them for 
 
39. Id. at 688. 
40. 369 U.S. 643 (1962). 
41. Sisk, supra note 19, at 455. 
42. Malone, 369 U.S. at 648. 
43. Sisk, supra note 19, at 446. 
44. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (internal citations omitted). 
45. Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1109, 1109 (2009). 
            
348 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:341 
torts inflicted by the government and its agents.46  This system was 
criticized “as being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust 
to the claimants, in that it [did] not accord to injured parties a recovery as a 
matter of right but [based] any award that may be made on considerations 
of grace.”47 
Many called for reform: “John Quincy Adams complained about the 
inordinate time Congress spent on claims matters.  Millard Fillmore urged 
that a tribunal be established to handle private claims.  Abraham Lincoln 
called for . . . change in his first annual message to Congress.”48  Relief 
finally came in 1946 as Congress attempted to cope with a government that 
had dramatically increased in size due to the Great Depression, World War 
II, and general Roosevelt Era Reforms.49  Part of the Legislative 
Reorganizing Act of 1946, Congress passed the FTCA.50  The Act’s 
objective was “to waive a part of the governmental immunity to suit in tort 
and permit suits on tort claims to be brought against the United 
States . . . .”51 
Upon its passage, the Act made the United States liable for damages 
caused by “any employee of the Government while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment . . . if [under the same circumstances] a private 
person would be liable . . . .”52  However, many legislators expressed 
concern with such a “radical innovation,” and certain exceptions to the 
Government’s general assumption of tort liability were made.53  One of 
these various exceptions—the intentional tort exception—was at the center 
of the dispute in Millbrook.54  Under the intentional tort exception, 
Congress has maintained governmental immunity from most intentional 
torts.55  Specifically, Congress has not waived governmental immunity from 
“any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
 
46. David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 378 (2011). 
47. H.R. DOC. NO. 1287, at 662 (1945). 
48. Figley, supra note 45, at 1108. 
49. Fuller, supra note 46, at 378. 
50. Figley, supra note 45, at 1109. 
51. H.R. DOC. NO. 1287, at 661 (1945). 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31). 
53. Fuller, supra note 46, at 384.  For example, the federal government still maintains 
immunity against suits based on government action of a discretionary nature, lost letters by the 
Postal Service, and claims arising in a foreign country.  28 U.S.C. § 2680 (West, Westlaw through 
P.L. 113-31). 
54. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (2013) (“We granted certiorari to 
resolve a Circuit split concerning the circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by 
law enforcement officers can give rise to an actionable claim under the FTCA.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31). 
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malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights.”56  In 1974, however, Congress 
carved out an exception to this reservation of immunity “by adding a 
proviso covering claims that arise out of the wrongful conduct of law 
enforcement officers.”57  This exception-to-the-exception has been dubbed 
the “law enforcement proviso.”58  It “extends the waiver of sovereign 
immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, 
that are based on the ‘acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement 
officers.’”59  “As a result of the law enforcement proviso, the FTCA now 
permits suits based on tortious conduct by federal law enforcement 
officers . . . .”60 
Congress decided to add this proviso, and waive immunity from torts 
committed by law enforcement officers, “in response to a national outcry 
over certain widely publicized law enforcement excesses in the early 
1970’s.”61  Raids conducted by federal drug enforcement agents (“DEA”) in 
Collinsville, Illinois were specifically mentioned in the statute’s legislative 
history.62  In an account detailing the alleged raids, the New York Times 
reported: 
The long haired, unshaven, poorly dressed men who burst into the 
[victims’] homes shouting obscenities were federal narcotics 
agents hunting, with no known warrants, for something or 
someone.  They went, however, to the wrong houses. . . . [They 
threw one victim] down on the bed, handcuffed his arms behind 
his back and said: you move and your [sic] dead . . . . There were 
crashes elsewhere. A television set among other things was thrown 
across a room. An antique plaster dragon was shattered. Cameras 
were smashed on the floor. Papers were strewn about.63 
Against this background, in Millbrook v. United States, the Court was 
tasked with determining how much of its sovereign immunity the federal 
government had actually intended to forfeit. 
 
56. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1443. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). 
60. Fuller, supra note 46, at 385. 
61. Id. 
62. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Sen. Rep. 93-588, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2791).  For an in-depth discussion of the 
Collinsville raids and Congress’ response, see Nguyen v. U.S., 556 F.3d 1244, 1254-57 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
63. Andrew Malcom, Drug Raids Terrorize 2 Families—by Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 
1973, at 1-2 (internal quotations omitted). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Thomas delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion.64  It held the 
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by 
law enforcement officers applies to such torts “regardless of whether the 
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are 
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest” when the tort 
was committed.65  First, the Court discussed its reason for granting 
certiorari.66  Next, it explained the proviso should be interpreted using a 
plain text approach.67  And last, the Court applied the interpretive canon of 
in pari materia.68 
A. THE COURT’S REASON FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI:  
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Court granted certiorari “to resolve a Circuit split concerning the 
circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by law 
enforcement officers can give rise to an actionable claim under the 
FTCA.”69  Specifically, the Court cited disagreement between the Third and 
Ninth Circuits’ narrow interpretation of the proviso and the Fourth Circuit’s 
broad interpretation.70 
In Pooler v. United States,71 the Third Circuit found the plaintiffs’ 
complaint insufficient to state a cause of action under the FTCA.72  The 
plaintiffs sued the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) alleging a police 
officer employed by the VA had unlawfully arrested them.73  The court 
interpreted the proviso to waive immunity only for torts committed by law 
enforcement officers during the specific law enforcement activities of 
 
64. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1442. 
65. Id. at 1446. 
66. Id. at 1444 (“We granted certiorari . . . to resolve a Circuit split concerning the 
circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by law enforcement officers can give 
rise to an actionable claim under the FTCA.”) (internal citation omitted). 
67. Id. at 1445 (“The plain language of the law enforcement proviso answers when a law 
enforcement officer’s ‘acts or omissions’ may give rise to an actionable tort claim under the 
FTCA.”). 
68. Id. at 1446 (“Congress adopted similar limitations in neighboring provisions . . . but did 
not do so here.  We, therefore, decline to read such a limitation into unambiguous text.”). 
69. Id. at 1444. 
70. Id. 
71. 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986). 
72. Id. at 873. 
73. Pooler, 787 F.2d at 869 (“The arrests were made pursuant to warrants issued by a 
Pennsylvania judicial officer on charges that Pooler and Bradley sold marijuana on the premises 
of the VA hospital . . . . [W]ith respect to the investigation, they allege that [authorities], in 
engaging the services of a VA employee . . . to serve as an informant, selected an unreliable 
person with known past drug involvement, and of less than average mental capacity.”). 
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preforming a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.74  Because the 
court found the plaintiffs’ complaint did not alleged a tort had occurred 
during one of those specific law enforcement activities, it upheld the lower 
court’s dismissal of the complaint.75  The court based its reasoning on the 
fact that § 2680(h) defined law enforcement officers as individuals 
“empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 
arrests for violations of Federal law.”76  Thus, under the holding in Pooler, 
the government retained immunity for all torts committed by law 
enforcement personnel—provided they were not committed during the three 
specific law enforcement activities enumerated in 2680(h)’s definition of a 
law enforcement officer.77 
Although not as strictly as Pooler, the Ninth Circuit, in Orsay v. United 
States Department of Justice,78 also defined the proviso narrowly.79  The 
plaintiffs, Deputy United States Marshalls, sued the Department of Justice80 
for an alleged assault by their supervisor.81  The complaint claimed that on 
a number of occasions the supervisor pointed a loaded gun at them and 
pretended to pull the trigger.82  Although not requiring the tort be 
committed during specific types of law enforcement activity, the court held 
the “waiver reaches only those claims asserting that the tort occurred in the 
course of investigative or law enforcement activities.”83  The court reasoned 
that the proviso’s legislative history, showing Congress was concerned with 
remedying federal law enforcement abuses, “lends support to a statutory 
construction that limits the government’s waiver of its immunity to 
intentional torts committed in the course of investigative or law 
enforcement activities.”84 
 
74. See Pooler, 787 F.2d at 872 (“[T]he Pooler and Bradley complaints do not state claims 
falling within the proviso to section 2680(h) because no federal officer is charged with a tort in the 
course of a search, a seizure, or an arrest.”). 
75. Id. (“No matter how generously we read them . . . the complaints do not charge that [the 
officer] committed an intentional tort while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an 
arrest.”). 
76. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
77. Id. 
78. 289 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). 
79. Id. at 1127. 
80. The United States Marshall Service is a subdivision of the United States Department of 
Justice.  Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (The supervisor “allegedly pointed a loaded gun at Appellants on a number of 
occasions, and said things like: ‘You’re dead,’ ‘You’re history,’ ‘Gotcha,’ and ‘You never had a 
chance.’”). 
83. Id. at 1136. 
84. Id. at 1135.  However, the court omitted any definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement activities.” 
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In Ignacio v. United States,85 the leading case on the other side of the 
split, the plaintiff sued the United States for an assault he allegedly suffered 
at the hands of a fellow employee while they were working as guards at a 
security checkpoint outside the Pentagon.86  The lower court, following the 
holding in Orsay, dismissed the complaint because the alleged tort did not 
occur while the tortfeasor was “engaged in investigative or law enforcement 
activities.”87  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held the law enforcement proviso “waives United States’ 
sovereign immunity regardless of whether an officer is engaged in an 
investigative or law enforcement activity when he commits an assault.”88  
The court found the plain language of the proviso required such a holding, 
and it opined the Pooler and Orsay Courts had erred in their interpretive 
methods: “[W]e note [those] courts relented to secondary modes of 
interpretation without first establishing the ambiguity of the statutory text.  
Where, as here, the text of the statute is unambiguous, we should not 
engage in an analysis of legislative history to find ambiguity.”89 
B. THE COURT’S PLAIN TEXT INTERPRETATION 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s plain text 
approach: “The plain text confirms that Congress intended immunity 
determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a 
particular exercise of that authority.”90  It rejected the court-appointed 
amicus curiae’s argument that immunity should only be waived for torts 
arising out of searches, seizures of evidence, or arrest, noting “the FTCA’s 
only reference to searches, seizures of evidence and arrests is found in the 
statutory definition of investigative or law enforcement officer.”91  The 
Court reasoned that while the statutory definition may focus on specific law 
enforcement tasks, the law enforcement proviso itself “focuses on the status 
of persons whose conduct may be actionable, not the types of activities that 
 
85. 674 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2012). 
86. See id. at 254 (“[W]hile stationed at a security checkpoint for Pentagon employees, Lane 
and Ignacio had a disagreement over the caliber of an M-16 round.  Initially, their disagreement 
led only to a bet.  It escalated . . . when they were again stationed at a security 
checkpoint . . . . Lane allegedly told Ignacio that he would ‘hurt him after work’ and then 
pretended to punch him in the face.”). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 253. 
89. Id. at 255. 
90. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1445. 
91. Id. at 1445 (internal quotation omitted). 
            
2013] CASE COMMENT 353 
may give rise to a tort claim against the United States.”92  Thus, the Court 
found “there is no basis for concluding that a law enforcement officer’s 
intentional tort must occur in the course of executing a search, seizing 
evidence, or making an arrest in order to subject the United States to 
liability.”93 
C. THE COURT’S USE OF THE INTERPRETIVE CANON IN PARI MATERIA 
Along with its textual argument, amicus asserted that “[a] conduct 
based reading is far more consistent with common sense . . . . A status 
based reading . . . would make the United States financially responsible for 
law-enforcement officers’ intentional torts having nothing to do with their 
law enforcement duties . . . but not for identical torts committed by other 
federal employees.”94  In responding to amicus’s argument, the Court relied 
on the interpretive canon of in pari materia—statutes should be construed 
together “so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking 
at another statute on the same subject.”95 
The Court reasoned that had Congress wanted to further narrow the 
scope of the proviso it would have: “Congress adopted similar limitations in 
neighboring provisions, but did not do so here.”96  As an example, the Court 
referred to the law enforcement proviso’s neighbor—28 U.S.C. 2680(a)—
which reserves immunity for “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of 
an employee of the Government . . . in the execution of a statute or 
regulation.”97  The Court claimed that similar to 2680(a)’s “in the execution 
of a statute or regulation” language, Congress could have added “acting in a 
law enforcement or investigative capacity” to the proviso, had it intended 
such a limit.98 
IV. IMPACT 
Overturning the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Court resolved a division 
among the Circuits regarding the interpretation of the FTCA’s law 
 
92. Id. (emphasis in original).  The Court’s focus on status was based on the fact that only in 
the last sentence of § 2680(h), which provides a definition of “investigative or law enforcement 
officer,” is there any mention of specific law enforcement activities.  The operational language of 
the waiver, found in the second sentence, plainly states immunity to intentional torts committed by 
officers, like other torts under the FTCA, shall be waived—it makes no mention of any requisite 
conduct or activity.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31). 
93. Id. 
94. Brief for Amicus at 6, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (No. 11-10362). 
95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 386 (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
96. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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enforcement proviso.99  Under the Court’s holding in Millbrook, the law 
enforcement proviso’s waiver of sovereign immunity for intentional torts 
committed by law enforcement officers applies “regardless of whether the 
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are 
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”100  The Court’s 
ruling leaves two significant questions open to litigation: First, who 
qualifies as a law enforcement officer?  And second, how will the Court’s 
interpretation of the law enforcement proviso be reconciled with 2680(a)’s 
discretionary function exception? 
A. WHO QUALIFIES AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER? 
Had the Court followed the Pooler holding and allowed suits to be 
brought against the government only for torts arising out of searches, 
seizures, or arrests, this question would likely be of little significance; most 
government agents who frequently engage in these types of activities are 
traditionally viewed as law enforcement officers.  However, after 
Millbrook, all that is required to maintain a suit is that the government agent 
be empowered with those capabilities—they need not have ever employed 
them.101  This clearly broadens the federal government’s waiver of 
immunity; many government agents, such as, food inspectors, customs 
officers, and Forest Service employees, are empowered to conduct searches, 
seize evidence, and make arrests.102  Whether Congress meant to include 
these types of government actors, who may not be traditionally viewed as 
law enforcement officers, is a question left unanswered. 
The Court, during oral arguments, was clearly concerned with the 
issue; the first question posed by the Court was whether, under the more-
relaxed Ignacio holding, the definition of law enforcement officer would 
include a government meat inspector.103  Responding to the Court’s 
question, the petitioner suggested that the proviso’s utilization of the term 
officer was indicative of Congress’s intent to limit liability to acts 
committed by those individuals traditionally viewed as law enforcements 




101. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31) defines the term law 
enforcement officer to mean “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to 
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law.” 
102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) 
(No. 11-10362). 
103. Id. at 3. 
104. Id. at 4. 
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individuals acting in a law enforcement capacity—core law enforcement 
officers—and those invested with the powers of search and seizure to 
perform inspections—administrative employees.105 
While this position seems convincing, it is tempered by the Court’s 
traditional practice of reading statutory waivers of immunity strictly106 and 
interpreting them using a plain text approach.107  The Court may decide that 
had Congress desired to limit the government’s waiver of immunity only to 
intentional torts committed by “traditional law enforcement officers” it 
would have added such language to the text.108  The language of the proviso 
clearly states that the term investigative or law enforcement officer “means 
any officer of the United States . . . empowered by law to execute searches, 
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal Law.”109  
Meat inspectors and other similar government agents are unquestionably 
vested with these types of powers.110 
Yet, while the Court has often resorted to plain text interpretation, it 
has also “said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must 
be unequivocally expressed . . . [and] [a]ny ambiguities in the statutory 
 
105. Id.  Petitioner also argued a distinction could be made regarding the drafters’ use of the 
term officer, rather than employee: “The proviso doesn’t [say] [sic] any employee of the United 
States who is authorized to carry out a search, seizure, or arrest. It used the term ‘any officer of the 
United States.’  And I believe the term officer carries some water here . . . . [W]e think it’s a 
plausible interpretation, that by using the term ‘officer’ rather than any employee of the United 
States, that there was a limiting factor imported into the statute . . . .”  Id. 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (“The question before us 
is whether the waiver of sovereign immunity . . . authorizes a refund . . . . In resolving this 
question, we may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language.  Our task 
is to discern the unequivocally expressed intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of 
immunity.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 
(2005) (“[W]e are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.  When the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
107. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal 
Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text”); United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (waivers of sovereign immunity must be 
“unequivocally expressed” and are generally not “liberally construed”). 
108. The Court used similar reasoning in Millbrook: “Had Congress intended to further 
narrow the scope of the proviso, Congress could have [added the language] acting in a law 
enforcement or investigative capacity.”  Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446 (emphasis in original). 
109. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13) (emphasis 
added). 
110. See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 603 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31) (“For the purpose of 
preventing the use in commerce of meat and meat food products which are adulterated, the 
Secretary shall cause to be made, by inspectors appointed for that purpose, an examination and 
inspection of all amenable species before they shall be allowed to enter into any slaughtering, 
packing, meat-canning, rendering, or similar establishment . . . and all amenable species found on 
such inspection to show symptoms of disease shall be set apart and slaughtered separately from all 
other [amenable species], and when so slaughtered the carcasses of said [amenable species] shall 
be subject to a careful examination and inspection . . . .”). 
            
356 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:341 
language are to be construed in favor of immunity.”111  To be sure, it now 
appears that the Court has decided to allow determinations of whether the 
proviso’s waiver of immunity will apply to a specific type of government 
agent to be made on a case-by-case basis.  In sum, because the Court has 
resolved the question of when immunity is waived under the proviso, it is 
likely there will be litigation concerning who the proviso’s waiver applies 
to. 
B. RECONCILING MILLBROOK WITH THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
EXCEPTION 
Before Millbrook, the Circuits were already divided as to how the law 
enforcement proviso’s waiver of immunity should be reconciled with  
§ 2680(a)’s discretionary function exception,112 which reserves immunity 
for torts committed by government agents while they are engaged in duties 
of a discretionary nature.113  In cases where a law enforcement officer is 
alleged to have committed a tort, some courts require the plaintiff both clear 
the discretionary function exception and meet the requirements of the law 
enforcement proviso’s waiver.114  Other courts allow suits meeting the 
requirements of the law enforcement proviso to go forward, despite the fact 
they may be discretionary and thus fall under § 2680(a).115 
Part of the reason for Pooler’s narrow holding was to “eliminate the 
likelihood of any overlap between” the two provisions.116  “It is hard to 
imagine instances in which the activities of officers engaging in searches, 
 
111. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012). 
112. See Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although the Fifth 
Circuit agrees with our reconciliation of § 2680(a) with (h) . . . five other circuits have taken a 
different approach about how the two subsections interact.”). 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13).  “[T]he 
discretionary function exception . . . generally shields the government from tort liability based on 
the acts or omissions of federal agencies and employees when they are exercising or performing a 
discretionary function.”  Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1250.  “[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it 
involves an element of judgment or choice.”  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 
(1988).  “[It] will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a 
course of action for an employee to follow.”  Id.  To be discretionary, acts or omissions must 
involve the use of “policy judgment.”  Id. at 539.  “[I]f the employee’s conduct cannot 
appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for 
the discretionary function exception to protect.”  Id. at 536. 
114. See e.g., Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs must “clear the 
discretionary function hurdle and satisfy the investigative or law enforcement officer limitation”) 
(emphasis in original). 
115. See e.g., Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1257 (“if a claim is one of those listed in the proviso to 
subsection (h), there is no need to determine if the acts giving rise to it involve a discretionary 
function; sovereign immunity is waived in any event.”). 
116. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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seizures or arrest would [be discretionary].”117  Now, under Millbrook’s 
broader holding, there is a greater likelihood of occurrences where alleged 
intentional torts will fall into both categories because the Court has 
eliminated the requirement that torts occur during specific law enforcement 
or investigative activities—most of which are unlikely to be 
discretionary.118  Thus, whether the Court will allow suits brought under the 
law enforcement proviso to go forward when they are of a discretionary 
nature is unknown.  However, given the holding in Millbrook, the 
likelihood that this issue will arise in the future has certainly increased. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Millbrook, the Court decided that Congress, via § 2680(h)’s law 
enforcement proviso, intended to consent to suits alleging intentional torts 
committed by federal law enforcement officers “regardless of whether the 
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity.”119  While 
the Court’s holding clarifies the circumstances under which the federal 
government has consented to intentional tort suits, it leaves two important 
questions unanswered: first, who qualifies as an “investigative or law 
enforcement officer,” and second, whether intentional tort suits may be 
brought against the government if the law enforcement officer was engaged 






119. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446. 
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